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22 FEB 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

ATTENTION:

FROM:

Deputy Director of Security
Personnel Security and Investigations

SUBJECT: Tscherim Soobzokov

REFERENCE: OGC Memorandum 83-00927
dated 1 February 1983

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. Office of Security records indicate that Tscherim Soobzokov was granted an operational clearance on 12 January 1953 for use as a spotter in Transjordon. The DDO project was terminated about April 1954 but as of 4 October 1954, Subject was being retained operationally. An Operational Approval was granted on 26 May 1955 (no additional information available). Provisional and full Covert Security Approvals were requested on 29 August 1956 to employ Subject as a cover associate. A Provisional Operational Approval was granted on 8 February 1975, which was immediately followed by a request for an Operational Approval. This request was canceled on 6 March 1957. Consideration was given to reviewing Subject's Operational Approval but based on polygraph testing, it was recommended that caution be exercised in granting approval of Subject's use for future or continued operations. The request for Operational Approval was canceled on 4 April 1980. Office of Security holdings do not reflect that Subject was ever made witting that his relationship was with the CIA. (S)

2. It is pointed out that the Office of Security file contains Office of General Counsel memorandum 80-01444 dated 21 February 1980, Department of Justice Document Rights - Tscherim Soobzokov. In this memorandum, the writer, [redacted], indicated that "when Soobzokov turned the document over to [redacted] in 1952 he knew [redacted] in true name but was not witting of [redacted]'s true employment. [redacted]"

[redacted] However, later file entries indicated that Soobzokov was probably made witting of [redacted]'s CIA

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employment. At a later date Soobzokov was definitely made witting that [redacted] [redacted]'s deputy, [redacted] [redacted], who handled Soobzokov in [redacted] [redacted]'s absence, was a CIA employee." This information was not derived from Soobzokov's Office of Security file. (S)

3. Please refer any questions in this matter to [redacted] [redacted] on red line extension 1893. (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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